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NOTES
RETROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF THE
2008 AMENDMENTS TO NEW YORK'S
ADVERSE POSSESSION LAWS
ANDRIANA MAVIDISt
The right being gone, of course the remedy fell with it; and as
there could be no remedy without a corresponding right, it was
useless for the legislature to restore the former, so long as it was
prohibited by the [C]onstitution from interfering or meddling
with the latter.1
INTRODUCTION
Sharon and her husband, Leonard Franza, purchased their
home on Kester Road in Memphis, New York2 in the fall of 1974
from their neighbors Barbara and Duane Olin.' The Olins owned
the property next to Sharon and Leonard's new home.4 Soon
thereafter, Sharon began tending to her house, yard, and also the
Olins' adjacent property.5 For over thirty years, Sharon regularly
mowed the lawn, raked the fallen leaves, and removed unwanted
shrubbery from her yard and the Olins'.' Shortly after moving
into her new home, Sharon also landscaped a garden on the
Olins' property, where she began planting and caring for trees
t Editor-in-Chief, St. John's Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2012, St. John's
University School of Law; B.B.A., Accounting, 2008, Baruch College. Many thanks to
Robert E. Parella, George F. Keenan Professor of Real Property Law, for his
guidance in writing this Note and his constant encouragement as an invaluable
mentor. This Note is dedicated to my parents Sotiria and Vaios, my sister Eudoxia,
and Lambros Georgallas. Without your extraordinary patience and unwavering love
and support, none of this would be possibe.
1 Knox v. Cleveland, 13 Wis. 245, 249 (1860).
See Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 1, Franza v. Olin, 73 A.D.3d 44, 897
N.Y.S.2d 804 (4th Dep't 2010) (No. 2008-7065).
3 See id.
See id.
6 See id. at 2.
6 See id.
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and other kinds of plants. Over twenty years ago, after realizing
that she needed more storage space, Sharon built a shed next to
her garden.' And around the same time she also erected a
satellite receiver on that same parcel.9 Over the years, Sharon
continued to tend, care to, and develop the Olins' property."o By
the mid-1990s, she had built a wishing well, windmill, horseshoe
pit, and even a swing set on their land.'
After thirty years, in an effort to avoid any future conflicts
with the Olins, Sharon sought to quiet title to the property
bordering her yard.12 Sharon asked the New York Supreme
Court of Onondaga County to declare that the Olins' title to that
specific parcel was extinguished as many as twenty-three years
earlier due to Sharon's successful adverse possession of that
land.13 To Sharon's surprise and dismay, the New York State
Supreme Court entered a judgment in favor of the Olins."
Between the time Sharon acquired title to that portion of the
Olins' property and the time she filed her action, New York's
adverse possession statutes were changed drastically." In
rendering its decision, the court applied the amended statute in
effect at the time Sharon filed her claim, as opposed to the law in
effect when she allegedly acquired title to the property.16  The
court concluded that Sharon's use and possession of the Olins'
property did not satisfy the new requirements and was
considered "permissive and non-adverse."" The court dismissed
Sharon's petition, stripping Sharon of the contested property that






12 See Franza v. Olin, 73 A.D.3d 44, 47, 897 N.Y.S.2d 804, 807 (4th Dep't 2010).
Sharon filed her action to quiet title on August 18, 2008. See id. at 46, 897 N.Y.S.2d
at 807.
's See id. at 47, 897 N.Y.S.2d at 807.
" See id. at 45-46, 897 N.Y.S.2d at 806-07.
'S See id. ("[Plaintiff does not have title to certain real property based on
adverse possession pursuant to [Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law
("RPAPL")] article 5.... [P]laintiffs use[] of the disputed property . .. [was]
permissive and non-adverse under the newly-enacted RPAPL 543." (emphasis
omitted)).
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this case was reversed on appeal by the Fourth Department of
the New York Appellate Division, if it were heard by the First or
Second Departments or by the New York Court of Appeals, there
remains a possibility that Sharon would have lost-highlighting
the potential issues created by this new legislation."
On July 7, 2008, the New York legislature amended over one
hundred and seventy-five years of adverse possession law.2 0
Prior to the amendments, a possessor would acquire title in
property that once belonged to someone else if possession was
proven to be: "(1) hostile and under claim of right; (2) actual;
(3) open and notorious; (4) exclusive; and (5) continuous for the
[statutorily] required""1 ten-year period.22 The 2008 overhaul of
this established legal principle produced three dramatic
differences between the old statute and the amended statute.
First, the adverse possessor now needs "a reasonable basis for
the belief that the property belongs to the adverse possessor or
property owner, as the case may be."23 Second, routine
maintenance, like "acts of lawn mowing or similar maintenance
across the boundary line of an adjoining landowner's
property . .. [are now] deemed permissive and non-adverse. "24
Lastly, de minimis and non-structural encroachments, such as
"fences, hedges, shrubbery, plantings, sheds[,] and non-structural
walls, shall [also] be deemed to be permissive and non-adverse."25
Consequently, Sharon's facts fell into the niche of cases-
specifically addressed in the second and third aforementioned
19 See id.; infra Part II.C-D.
20 New York's first adverse possession statute was enacted in 1829 as part of
New York's Revised Statutes. 2 N.Y. REV. STAT., pt. 3, ch. 4, tit. 2, art. 1, §§ 1-17
(1829). Since 1829, the statutes underwent some minor aesthetic revisions, but the
substance of the laws remained relatively the same. Compare id., with 4 N.Y. Civ. P.
Act, §§ 31-43 (1921), and N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW §§ 501-51 (McKinney 1963).
21 Walling v. Przybylo, 7 N.Y.3d 228, 232, 851 N.E.2d 1167, 1169, 818 N.Y.S.2d
816 (2006).
22 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 212(a) (McKinney 2011).
23 N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 501(3) (McKinney 2011). See Jason Greenberg,
Note, Reasonableness Is Unreasonable: A New Jurisprudence of New York Adverse
Possession Law, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2491, 2492, 2502-11 (2010) for a discussion on
some of the ambiguities raised by the new claim of right element found in section
501.
24 N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 543(2) (McKinney 2011).
25 Id. § 543(1); see, e.g., Walling, 7 N.Y.3d 228, 851 N.E.2d 1167, 818 N.Y.S.2d
816 (erecting shed, digging trench, mowing, planting and raking grassy area in




changes-that would warrant starkly different results under the
old statute versus the amended statute. Under the old statute,
Sharon adversely possessed her neighbor's property and had
vested title.2 6 However, under the amendments, Sharon's use of
the disputed parcel was permissive, non-adverse, and did not
vest her with title.27
In deciding to apply the amended statute, the lower court in
Franza v. Olin relied on a literal reading of section 9 of the
amendments, which defines their scope, and did not engage in
the requisite statutory construction. Section 9 states that,
"This act shall take effect immediately, and shall apply to claims
filed on or after such effective date."2 9  Under a literal
interpretation of section 9, the lower court appears to have
correctly applied the amendments to Sharon's petition. After all,
Sharon filed her claim to quiet title six weeks after the effective
date, which rendered it a "claim[] filed on or after July 7,
2008"-the effective date. 0 However, had the court looked at the
purpose behind adverse possession laws generally-or more
specifically, the amendments, as proper statutory construction
requires-it would have realized that the amendments should
not have been applied to Sharon's claim.3 ' Nonetheless, the
Fourth Department of the New York Appellate Division still
reversed the New York Supreme Court's decision on separate and
distinct constitutional grounds.3 2 The court found that "title to
the disputed property would have vested in [Sharon] prior to the
enactment of the 2008 amendments . . [rendering] application of
those amendments to [Sharon] . . . unconstitutional."3 3 The
matter was remanded for a determination of Sharon's rights
under the original statute in effect at the time she allegedly
acquired title to the Olins' property.3 4
Although the Third Department has joined the Fourth in
declining to apply section 9 where it would permit the
retrospective application of the amended statute to vested
26 See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAw §§ 501-51 (McKinney 1963).
27 See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 543 (McKinney 2011).
2 See 73 A.D.3d 44, 46, 897 N.Y.S.2d 804, 807 (4th Dep't 2010).
29 See Ch. 269, § 9, 2008 N.Y. LAWs 892, 894 (McKinney).
3 Franza, 73 A.D.3d at 46, 897 N.Y.S.2d at 807.
31 See infra Part III.A.
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property rights, the issue still remains unresolved in New York.
Neither the New York Court of Appeals nor the First Department
has addressed how section 9 should be interpreted and
consequently how the 2008 amendments should be applied. And
dicta from the Second Department suggests that if it were
confronted with facts similar to Franza, the court might also
interpret section 9 according to its literal meaning and apply the
amendments retrospectively.
While this issue remains unsettled, New York faces an
indeterminate period of future litigation in this area, coupled
with the abrogation of vested property rights without just
compensation in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. This
issue arises specifically for possessors, similar to Sharon, who
would qualify as having successfully adversely possessed a piece
of property under the old statute, but not under the amended
statute ("niche possessors"). If courts were permitted to rely on
the literal interpretation of section 9, niche possessors would be
susceptible to losing their property forever. For example,
because a niche possessor's title is not considered vested under
the 2008 amendments, an original owner who did not avail
himself of the right to eject the niche possessor during the
requisite statutory period could bring an ejectment action at any
time after the statutory period ended. In this manner, an
original owner can use section 9 offensively to regain possession
of land he already lost title to for an indefinite period of time.
Therefore, a literal reading of section 9 essentially extinguishes
the limitations period for real property actions in niche possessor
cases.
This Note argues that the new requirements imposed by
New York's amended adverse possession statute are being
unconstitutionally applied retrospectively to vested property
rights, thereby divesting individuals of their property without
just compensation. Part I outlines the history of adverse
possession and the status of the law in New York today. Part II
exposes the issues in applying the amended statutes by looking
at how recent New York State Supreme Court and Appellate
Division cases have interpreted section 9. Part III analyzes the
" See, e.g., Almeida v. Wells, 74 A.D.3d 1256, 1258, 904 N.Y.S.2d 736, 739-40
(2d Dep't 2010) (finding Plaintiffs adverse possession claim failed on common law
elements, but noting that the governing statute would have been the one in effect at
the time the claim was filed).
2011] 1061
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issues raised by the retrospective application of the amended
statute through statutory construction and a discussion of
the policies behind adverse possession. This Part will also
demonstrate how the indefinite expansion of the limitations
period for adverse possession-as permitted by the literal
interpretation of section 9-abrogates substantive rights as well
as procedural remedies. Consequently, the limitations period for
adverse possession is distinct from purely procedural statutes of
limitations that have been revived and upheld by New York as
constitutional. Lastly, this Part will argue that retrospective
application of the amended laws to vested property rights
violates the Fourteenth Amendment as an unconstitutional
taking of property without just compensation. Part IV proposes
three solutions: (1) the New York Court of Appeals hears and
decides a case on point, setting the requisite precedent; (2) the
legislature modifies the language of section 9 to prohibit the
retrospective application of the amended statutes to niche
possessors; or (3) New York justly compensates niche possessors
divested of their property in this manner with the fair market
value of their property at the time of divestment.
I. ADVERSE POSSESSION IS A TWO-CENTURY-OLD DOCTRINE,
LITTLE CHANGED IN NEW YORK UNTIL 2008
A. The Inception ofAdverse Possession Can Be Traced Back to
Twelfth-Century England
Adverse possession has been enforced as "a necessary means
of clearing disputed titles"3 6 in New York for more than two
hundred years. Essentially a policy decision,3 8 this legal
doctrine is the product of a statute of limitations on actions
enforcing rights to real property." Adverse possession was born
" Walling v. Przybylo, 7 N.Y.3d 228, 233, 851 N.E.2d 1167, 1170, 818 N.Y.S.2d
816 (2006).
" The first New York statute of limitations on actions for the recovery of land
was enacted in 1788, making adverse possession a 222 year-old statutory principle.
See Ch. 43, 1788 N.Y. LAWS 683 (Weed).
3 See Belotti v. Bickhardt, 228 N.Y. 296, 308, 127 N.E. 239, 243 (1920) (noting
that adverse possession "is a necessary means of clearing disputed titles and the
courts adopt it and enforce it, because, when adverse possession is carefully and
fully proven, it is a means of settling disputed titles and this is desirable").
3 See HENRY F. BUSWELL, THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND ADVERSE
POSSESSION 4 (1991).
1062 [Vol. 85:1057
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when legislative authority made the presumption of ownership
arising from long possession conclusive.40 It is a means by which
a person who uses another individual's real41 or personal42
property for a statutorily determined period of time becomes the
owner of the property.43 As a statute of repose," "[aldverse
possession for the requisite period of time not only cuts off the
true owner's remedies but also divests [the owner] of his [or her]
estate."4 5 Thus, at the expiration of the statutory period, the
owner's legal title to the land is extinguished and is vested in the
46 4adverse possessor, even if the former had legal or record title.47
40 Adverse possession is a derivative of the common law rules of prescription,
which only raised a presumption of title under common law. "[N]o length of
possession will, in law, create a conclusive presumption of title, unless by the force of
a positive statute." Id. at 3. Since adverse possession is generally a question of fact,
the jury makes the final determination. See Ramapo Mfg. Co. v. Mapes, 216 N.Y.
362, 370, 110 N.E. 772, 775 (1915).
" See Van Valkenburgh v. Lutz, 304 N.Y. 95, 98, 106 N.E.2d 28, 29 (1952).
42 See generally Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 77 N.Y.2d 311, 569
N.E.2d 426, 567 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1991).
' See Walling v. Przybylo, 7 N.Y.3d 228, 233, 851 N.E.2d 1167, 1170, 818
N.Y.S.2d 816 (2006) ("Adverse possession, although not a favored method of
procuring title, is a recognized one.") (quoting Belotti v. Bickhardt, 228 N.Y. 296,
308, 127 N.E. 239, 243 (1920)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
" See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN
UNION 365 (Da Capo Press 1972) (1868).
A limitation law fixes upon a reasonable time within which a party is
allowed to bring suit to recover his rights, and, if he fails to do so,
establishes a legal presumption against him that he has no rights in the
premises.... [The government] is not bound to keep its courts open
indefinitely for one who neglects or refuses to apply for redress until it may
fairly be presumed that the means by which the other party might disprove
the claim are lost in the lapse of time.
Id.
I Franza v. Olin, 73 A.D.3d 44, 47, 897 N.Y.S.2d 804, 807 (4th Dep't 2010)
(second and third alterations in original) (quoting Connell v. Ellison, 86 A.D.2d 943,
944, 448 N.Y.S.2d 580, 581 (3d Dep't 1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Where under common law, only prescription was deemed to affect the right to
property, and the statute of limitations was only considered to bar the remedy of
ejectment, today New York's statute of limitation expressly states that the adverse
possessor "gains title to the occupied real property upon the expiration of the statute
of limitations." N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 501(2) (McKinney 2011). Thus, adverse
possession during the period of limitation extinguishes the previous owner's right to
that property. See BUSWELL, supra note 39.
46 See Franza, 73 A.D.3d at 47, 897 N.Y.S.2d at 807.
4 N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 501(1) (acknowledging that adverse possession
divests the original owner of property of their superior ownership rights without
excepting those with record or legal title).
2011]1 1063
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Limitations on real actions can be traced as far back
as twelfth-century England.4 8 Interestingly, it appears that
the first recorded instance of adverse possession involved
retrospective application, regardless of when a claim was
brought.4 9 Real property could not be recovered where the right
of the claimant accrued before the year 1100-the first year of
the reign of Henry Io This limitation was reduced time and time
again as the throne of England continued to change hands, using
each coronation of a new king as the benchmark for the
limitation."' As the periods created by these statutes grew
longer, the number of lawsuits and other inconveniences did as
well." England needed "a more direct and commodious course."53
Consequently, in the sixteenth century,54 Henry VIII imposed a
limitation by way of a fixed period of years.5 "The limitation of
time, in every case, was reduced to a fixed interval between the
accrual of the right and the commencement of the action."6
Thereafter, in 1623 James I enacted a "more mature[] and
comprehensive statute"" that was later adopted by New York in
creating its own first statute of limitations on real property
actions." What is referred to today as a statute of limitations
on actions in ejectment, the statute provided a twenty-year




51 See BUSWELL, supra note 39, at 13-14.
5 See id. at 14.
5 Id. (quoting Coke, 2 Inst. 95) (internal quotation marks omitted).
' See id.
5 See RALEIGH supra note 48; 32 Hen. VIII, c.2 (1540).
56 Kyle v. Green Acres at Verona, Inc., 207 A.2d 513, 514 (N.J. 1965). The Act of
Henry VIII held in pertinent part that:
No person shall sue, have, or maintain any writ of right or make any
prescription, title, or claime to, for any Mannors, Lands, Tenements, Rents,
Annuities, Commons, Pensions, Portions, Corodies, or other Hereditaments
of the possession of his or their Ancestors or predecessors; and declare and
alleadge any further seisin or possession of his or their Ancestor or
predecessor, but onley of the seisin or possession of his Ancestor or
predecessor, which hath beene, or now is, or shall be seised of the said
Mannors, Lands ... or other Hereditaments within sixtie yeares next
before the teste of the same writ, or next before the said prescription title or
claime so sued, commenced, brought, made, or had.
BUSWELL, supra note 39, at 553.
* BUSWELL, supra note 39, at 14.
See People v. Clarke, 9 N.Y. 349, 361-62 (1853).
1064 [Vol. 85:1057
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limitations period on all actions enforcing rights to real
property.5 9  The statute was enacted with the purpose of
"quieting . . . men's estates, and avoiding . . . suits."" And
operated to "bar[] the real owner's right to recover his
property .. . extinguish his title[, and make absolute the
wrongful possessor's.""
The language of James I's Act of Limitations was adopted
nearly verbatim by the State of New York when it passed its first
statute of limitations in 1788." There were two primary
differences between the two statutes. New York's statute had a
period of limitations of forty years instead of twenty and an
effective date of January 1, 1800.3
While the birth of adverse possession is deeply rooted in New
York's first statute of limitations, it was not until 1829, as part of
New York's Revised Statutes, that New York codified the
different characteristics of possession required for successful
adverse possession. In addition to possessing the property for the
requisite statutorily prescribed time, the Revised Statutes
enumerated requisite characteristics of possession.6 4 Under this
statute and related case-law, possession had to be (1) hostile and
5' See BUSWELL, supra note 39, at 556 (providing a full copy of James I's statute,
An Act for Limitation of Actions, and for Avoiding of Suits in Law).
[A]11 writs of formedon in descender, formedon in remainder, and formedon
in reverter, at any time hereafter to be sued or brought, of, or for any
mannors, lands, tenements, or, hereditaments, whereunto any person or
persons now hath or have any title, or cause to have or pursue any such
writ, shall be sued or taken within twenty years next after the end of this
present session of Parliament: And after the said twenty years expired, no
person or persons, or any of their heirs, shall have or maintain any such
writ, of or for any of the said manors, lands, tenements, or
hereditaments ....
Id. (quoting 21 James I, c. 16 (1623)).
60 Brand v. Prince, 35 N.Y.2d 634, 636, 324 N.E.2d 314, 315, 364 N.Y.S.2d 826,
828 (1974) (quoting 21 Jac. I, ch. 16) (internal quotation marks omitted).
61 Id.
62 See Clarke, 9 N.Y. at 362.
61 See id.; Ch. 43, 1788 N.Y. LAWS 683 (Weed). The statute provided in relevant
part that:
[TIhe people of the State of New York shall not, nor will ... make any title,
claim, challenge or demand . . . by reason of any right or title which hath
not first accrued and grown, or which [shall] not thereafter first accrue and
grow within the space of forty years next before the filing, issuing, or
commencing of every such action, bill, plaint, information, commission or
other suit or proceeding . ...
Id.
64 See 2 N.Y. REV. STAT., pt. 3, ch. 4, tit. 2, art. 1, §§ 1-17 (1829).
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under claim of right; (2) actual; (3) open and notorious;
(4) exclusive; and (5) continuous for the statutorily required
period of time.65  The Revised Statutes reduced the limitations
period from forty to twenty years. Since 1829, the statutes
underwent some minor aesthetic revisions, but the substance of
the laws remained relatively unchanged until the 2008
amendments.6 7  "The most significant change adopted over the
past century and a half... [was limited to] a reduction in the
length of time required to establish a claim of adverse
possession." After the Revised Statutes, the limitations period
was reduced again in 1932 to fifteen years69 and further reduced
in 1963 to the ten-year period in force today.70
In 2006, two decisions from the Third Department of the
New York Appellate Division and the New York Court of Appeals
sparked the movement toward the biggest change in New York's
adverse possession history. In Walling v. Pryzbolo, the court held
that "conduct will prevail over knowledge."' In other words,
"adverse possession will defeat a deed even if the adverse
possessor has knowledge of the deed."7 In Walling, Plaintiffs'
claim did not fail because they had "actual knowledge of the true
owner at the time of possession." Instead, the court found that
Plaintiffs' possession was in a manner consistent with all of the
elements required to demonstrate successful adverse possession
under the statute in effect at that time, and their title was
upheld.7 4
65 See id. § 8-13.
6 See id.
6 Compare id. §§ 1-17, with 4 N.Y. Civ. P. Act, §§ 31-43 (1921), and N.Y. REAL
PROP. ACTS. LAW §§ 501-51 (McKinney 1963), with Ch. 269, 2008 N.Y. LAWS 892,
894 (McKinney). On March 13, 1962, New York legislature created the consolidated
Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law ("RPAPL") when it decided to transfer
provisions from the Civil Practice Act to RPAPL without making any substantial
revisions. See Memorandum of Sen. Pierce, Bill Jacket, ch. 312, L. 1962.




n Walling v. Przybylo, 7 N.Y.3d 228, 232, 851 N.E.2d 1167, 1170, 818 N.Y.S.2d
816 (2006).
72 Id.
71 Id. at 232, 851 N.E.2d at 1169-70.
74 See id. at 233, 851 N.E.2d at 1170.
1066 [Vol. 85:1057
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Just months later, in Robinson v. Robinson, the court made a
similar ruling. In Robinson, Plaintiff subjectively believed that
Defendant might have been the rightful owner of the property in
dispute.75 Nonetheless, the court found that Plaintiffs subjective
belief was irrelevant to the court's decision of whether Plaintiff
satisfied the elements of adverse possession. Since Plaintiff
satisfied all the requisite elements of the adverse possession
statute in effect at the time, Plaintiffs title was upheld.
B. The 2008 Amendments Were the Most Drastic Change to New
York's Adverse Possession Laws Since 1829
In response to Walling and Robinson, in 2008 the New York
legislature passed the most dramatic substantive change in its
adverse possession laws since their enactment. According to
proponent Senator Elizabeth Little, Walling and Robinson
"encourage[d] the offensive use of adverse possession."" As a
result, Senate Bill 7915-C-which was proposed to reduce
"stealth" takeovers by persons acting in bad faith-was approved
in 2008."
Amongst others, the 2008 amendments made three
momentous changes. First, before 2008 a possessor's subjective
belief about the ownership of the disputed property was
irrelevant." Whether a possessor mistakenly believed that the
property was his, or knew that it belonged to another, was
immaterial and would not defeat his adverse possession claim.81
However, with the enactment of the 2008 amendments, an
adverse possessor must now show that he had "a reasonable
basis for the belief that the property belongs to the adverse
possessor."8 2 Although New York courts have not yet interpreted
this new element, it seems to require that the adverse possessor's
" See Robinson v. Robinson, 34 A.D.3d 975, 977, 825 N.Y.S.2d 277, 280-81 (3d
Dep't 2006).
76 See id.
7 See id. at 977, 825 N.Y.S.2d at 280.
7 Introducer's Memorandum in Support, Bill Jacket, ch. 269, L. 2008.
7 N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Memorandum in Support, Bill Jacket, ch. 269, L. 2008;
Governor's Approval Memorandum, ch. 269, L. 2008.
80 See Walling v. Przybylo, 7 N.Y.3d 228, 232, 851 N.E.2d 1167, 1169-70, 818
N.Y.S.2d 816 (2006) (holding that actual knowledge that the land is not yours does
not defeat an adverse possession claim).
" See id. at 232, 851 N.E.2d at 1169.
82 N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 501(3) (McKinney 2011).
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subjective belief be judged against an objective standard of
reasonableness. Under the amendments, an adverse possession
claim by a possessor who knew that the disputed property was
not his would likely fail. Second, before 2008 none of a
possessor's acts were deemed permissive unless the original
owner made a disclaimer to the possessor granting him
permission to use the owner's land.84 In contrast, the 2008
amendments make certain acts of routine maintenance
permissive without requiring a disclaimer by the owner. 5 Those
acts include "lawn mowing or similar maintenance across the
boundary line of an adjoining landowner's property."8  Finally,
before 2008 no specific improvement was categorically considered
permissive. However, with the passage of the 2008
amendments, de minimis and non-structural encroachments such
as "fences, hedges, shrubbery, plantings, sheds[,] and non-
structural walls ... [are now categorically] deemed to be
permissive and non-adverse."8 8
The legislature also included an instruction in the
amendments about their scope and effective date. Section 9 of
the amendments states in its entirety that the amendments
"shall take effect immediately, and shall apply to claims filed on
or after" July 7, 2008.89 The legislature did not provide any
additional guidance on what type of claims should be governed by
the amendments. Consequently, a literal reading of section 9
appears to permit courts to broadly apply the amendments to all
claims filed on or after July 7, 2008. This broad interpretation
conflicts with the legislative intent behind the amendments and
83 See generally Greenberg, supra note 23, for a discussion on some of the
ambiguities raised by the new claim of right element found in RPAPL Article 5
section 501.
8 See Knapp v. Hughes, 25 A.D.3d 886, 891, 808 N.Y.S.2d 791, 796 (3d Dep't
2006) (noting that express permission before the statute of limitations expires makes
possession permissive).
8 See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 543(2) (McKinney 2011).
86 Id.
1 See Walling v. Przybylo, 7 N.Y.3d 228, 232, 851 N.E.2d 1167, 1169, 818
N.Y.S.2d 816 (2006).
" See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 543(1) (McKinney 2011); accord Walling, 7
N.Y.3d 228, 851 N.E.2d 1167, 818 N.Y.S.2d 816 (2006) (erecting shed, digging
trench, mowing, planting and raking grassy area in question, constructing
underground dog wire fence, and installing post for birdhouse were deemed adverse).
" See ch. 269, § 9, 2008 N.Y. LAws 892, 894 (McKinney).
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the legal doctrine of adverse possession.90 However, many of
New York's Supreme Courts have not engaged in statutory
construction to interpret how the amendments should be applied.
Instead, they have consistently relied solely on a literal reading
of section 9-applying the 2008 amendments to all claims,
irrespective of whether they involve vested rights.9' This raises
serious constitutional and policy concerns for claims where a
successful niche possessor became vested with title to property
before the amendments' effective date.92 By not explicitly
prohibiting retrospective application of the 2008 amendments to
vested rights, the legislature created an opportunity for courts to
misapply the amendments and divest niche possessors of their
private property93-an act that amounts to an unconstitutional
taking in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.94
II. THE ISSUE OF RETROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF THE 2008
AMENDMENTS REMAINS UNRESOLVED IN NEW YORK
The 2008 amendments to New York's adverse possession
statute have raised critical policy and constitutional concerns as
a result of their retrospective misapplication by New York
Supreme Courts to the vested property rights of niche
possessors.9 s Many New York Supreme Courts have incorrectly
relied solely on the literal interpretation of section 9 of the
amendments in determining whether the amendments should be
applied to a particular claim." As a result of failing to perform
the requisite statutory analysis for new legislation, these courts
are continuing to divest niche possessors of their property. Thus
" See infra Part III.A (discussing the statutory construction of the amendments
and the legislative intent behind legal doctrine of adverse possession).
* See infra Part II.
92 See infra Part III.B-D.
* See, e.g., infra Part II.
- See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause was
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment and applies to states. See Kelo v. City
of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 472 n.1 (2005); see also infra Part III.D (discussing
how retrospective application of the 2008 amendments to vested property rights
amounts to an unconstitutional taking of private property in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
" As previously mentioned, this Note uses the term "niche possessor" to describe
a possessor similar to Ms. Franza in Franza v. Olin, 73 A.D.3d 44, 897 N.Y.S.2d 804
(4th Dep't 2010), who would qualify as having successfully adversely possessed a
piece of property under the old adverse possession statute, but not under the
amended statute.
" See, e.g., infra Part II.A-D.
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far, only the Third and Fourth Departments of the New York
Appellate Division have held that retrospective application of
the 2008 amendments to the vested property rights of niche
possessors is unconstitutional." However, the issue still remains
unsettled in New York. Neither the First Department nor the
New York Court of Appeals has addressed this issue. Further, a
recent decision by the Second Department appears to leave open
the possibility for retrospective application of the amendments in
the Second Department." Until the New York Court of Appeals
hears a case on point, the New York Legislature must either
modify the language of section 9 to prohibit retrospective
application of the 2008 amendments to vested rights or, in the
alternative, justly compensate niche possessors deprived of their
property in this manner.
A. Fourth Department of the New York Appellate Division Holds
that the 2008 Amendments Cannot Be Retrospectively
Applied
The Fourth Department of the New York Appellate Division
was the first appellate court to reverse a lower court decision and
hold that retrospective application of the 2008 amendments that
would divest a possessor of their property is unconstitutional. In
Franza v. Olin,99 the New York Supreme Court of Onondaga
County, held that "there [was] no question that the amendments
appl[ied]" since Franza sought to quiet title to the property six
weeks after the effective date of the amendments.'o Franza was
a niche possessoro who had been adversely using and improving
her neighbors' property for over thirty years. 102 According to
the facts in Franza's verified complaint and supporting
documentation, title to the property would have vested in Franza
"long before the July 2008 amendments." 0 3 Nonetheless, the
9 See infra Part IA-B.
9 See infra Part HI.C.
9 73 A.D.3d 44, 897 N.Y.S.2d 804 (4th Dep't 2010).
100 Id. at 46-47, 897 N.Y.S.2d at 806-07.
101 "Niche possessor" is used to describe an adverse possessor who would have
qualified as having successfully adversely possessed a piece of property under the
old statute, but not under the 2008 amendments.
102 Compare supra note 88 and accompanying text, with Franza, 73 A.D.3d at
46-48, 897 N.Y.S.2d at 807-08 (4th Dep't 2010) (discussing the type of acts and
improvements that Franza's adverse possession claim was founded upon).
103 Franza, 73 A.D.3d at 47, 897 N.Y.S.2d at 807.
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lower court declined to apply "the version . . . in effect when
[Franza's] claim to the disputed property allegedly ripened into
title."04 Instead, the court relied exclusively on the literal
interpretation of section 9 and applied the 2008 amendments to
Franza's case. 0 Franza's use of the property did not satisfy the
new requirements, and her petition was dismissed.'o
The Fourth Department of the New York Appellate Division
reversed.' 7 The Fourth Department held that "inasmuch as title
to the disputed property would have vested in [Franza] prior to
the enactment of the 2008 amendments ... application of those
amendments to [Franza was] unconstitutional."' The
declaration was vacated and the matter was remitted to the
lower court for a determination of Franza's rights to the disputed
property pursuant to the adverse possession laws in effect at the
time her possession ripened into title. 0 '
B. Third Department of the New York Appellate Division also
Holds that the 2008 Amendments Cannot Be Retrospectively
Applied
About a year after the Fourth Department's decision in
Franza, the Third Department of the New York Appellate
Division reversed a lower court decision on the same grounds. In
Barra v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co.,1 0 the New York Supreme
Court of Tompkins County held that the 2008 amendments were
applicable because Plaintiffs filed their claim to a prescriptive
easement over Defendants' land after the effective date of the
amendments."' In Barra, Plaintiffs owned property on the
eastern shore of a lake in Tompkins County" 2-with a lake to the
west and railroad tracks owned by Defendant to the east."'
In March of 2008, Defendant closed one of three railroad
104 Id. at 46, 897 N.Y.S.2d at 807.
105 See id.
1'0 See id.
17 See id. at 48, 897 N.Y.S.2d at 808.
108 Id. at 47-48, 897 N.Y.S.2d at 808.
109 See id. at 48, 897 N.Y.S.2d at 808.
"1 No. 2009-0279 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Tompkins Cnty. Sep. 14, 2009), rev'd in part
and modified in part, 75 A.D.3d 821, 907 N.Y.S.2d 70 (3d Dep't 2010).
n. See id. at 5-6.
112 See id. at 1.
113 See id.
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crossings."' A year later, Plaintiffs commenced an action
claiming that they had a prescriptive easement of ingress and
egress over the closed crossing."' Defendant moved to dismiss
Plaintiffs' claim.1 16  Similar to the lower court in Franza, the
court also relied on a literal interpretation of section 9 of the
amendments and applied the 2008 amendments to Plaintiffs'
claim.117  In order to have a successful claim under the
amendments, Plaintiffs had to establish that they used
Defendant's land under a claim of right with "a reasonable basis
for the belief that the property belong[ed] to them.""8  In
response, Plaintiffs argued that the general appurtenance
clauses in their deeds gave them a reasonable basis for the belief
that they had a legal right to use the crossing.119 This argument
was unsuccessful and Defendant's motion to dismiss was
granted. 120
On appeal, the Third Department of the New York Appellate
Division reversed.121 The Third Department held that since
Plaintiffs' prescriptive periods commenced and concluded prior to
the effective date of the amendments, Plaintiffs' alleged use
ripened into ownership or an easement before the 2008
amendments .122 "Accordingly, notwithstanding the statutory
language to the contrary, at trial, [P]laintiffs [were] entitled to
have their claims measured in accordance with the law of
prescription as it existed prior to the enactment of the 2008
amendments."123
1' See id.
11 See id. at 2.
11 See id. at 1.
1' See id. at 5-6.
118 Id. at 6 (quoting N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 501(3) (McKinney 2011)).
n1 See id. at 6.
120 See id. at 8.
121 See Barra v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 75 A.D.3d 821, 826, 907 N.Y.S.2d 70, 74-75
(3d Dep't 2010).
122 See id. at 825-26, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 74.
123 Id. at 826, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 74.
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C. The Second Department of the New York Appellate Division
Leaves Open the Possibility of Retrospective Application of
the 2008 Amendments
Dicta in a recent Second Department decision leaves open
the possibility of retrospective application of the 2008
amendments in cases similar to Franza and Barra, even though
decisions by lower courts are in conflict. Within the Second
Department's jurisdiction, there is a trend among the lower
courts to follow the precedent of the Third and Fourth
Departments and decline to retrospectively apply the 2008
amendments to niche possessors. 124  If a niche possessor
demonstrates successful adverse possession of contested property
under the requirements of the law in effect at the time title
allegedly ripened in the possessor, the lower courts have found
themselves bound to apply that law. 125 According to the lower
courts, the 2008 amendments would be inapplicable to a claim
filed after the effective date if title would have allegedly ripened
prior to the effective date.126
However, in the more recent case of Almeida v. Wells, 127 the
Second Department applied the law in effect at the time the
action commenced, and not the law in effect at the time title
would have allegedly ripened in the possessor.1 28 Almeida raises
serious concerns that if the aforementioned lower court cases
within the Second Department were appealed, decisions that
were once correctly decided might be disturbed.129 In Almeida,
Plaintiff sought to quiet title to property she claimed to have
adversely possessed from 1955 to 1991.13s The court found that
Plaintiff did not successfully demonstrate all of the elements
of adverse possession.13' Plaintiff failed to prove that she
124 See Wolfsohn v. Seabreeze Estate L.L.C., No. 225822008, 28 Misc. 3d
1239(A), 2010 NY Slip Op 51639(U), at 6 (Sup. Ct. Queens Cnty. Sep. 15, 2010).
125 See id.
126 See id.
127 74 A.D.3d 1256, 904 N.Y.S.2d 736 (2d Dep't 2010).
128 See id. at 1258, 904 N.Y.S.2d at 738.
129 See id. at 1258, 904 N.Y.S.2d at 738-39.
s See id. at 1257, 904 N.Y.S.2d at 738.
'a' See id. at 1258, 904 N.Y.S.2d at 739.
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"cultivated, improved, or substantially enclosed the land."132 The
lower court's decision was reversed, and Defendant's motion for
summary judgment was granted. 133
In Almeida, Plaintiffs claim failed on an element of adverse
possession that was required by both the old adverse possession
statute as well as the 2008 amendments. 134 Therefore, Plaintiff
never could have successfully acquired title to the property
under either law. Consequently, Plaintiff also could not be
subsequently divested of that property by the Second
Department. However, the reasoning used by the Almeida court
in reaching their decision was flawed and could result in the
deprivation of property in the case of a niche possessor.135
Despite the fact that Plaintiffs title would have ripened long
before the 2008 amendments were enacted, the Second
Department relied on a literal interpretation of section 9
and applied "the law in effect at the time [the] action
was commenced."36 The court did not even acknowledge the
constitutional issues raised in Franza or Barra in its reasoning.
The court's decision in Maya's Black Creek, LLC v. Angelo
Balbo Realty Corp.13 ' demonstrates the uncertainty in the Second
Department as well as the court's unwillingness to take a firm
position in this realm of adverse possession law. In Maya the
court stated,
We note that the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, has
held that the version of the law in effect at the time that the
purported adverse possession allegedly ripened into title is the
law applicable to the claim, regardless of whether the action
was commenced before or after the effective date of the new
legislation. However, we need not reach the issue decided by
132 Id. at 1258, 904 N.Y.S.2d at 739 (quoting Walsh v. Ellis, 64 A.D.3d 702, 703,
883 N.Y.S.2d 563, 565 (2d Dep't 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
113 See id.
13' Compare N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 601 (McKinney 1963), with N.Y. REAL
PROP. ACTS. LAW § 522 (McKinney 2011).
13 Compare Almeida, 74 A.D.3d at 1258, 904 N.Y.S.2d at 738-39, with Barra v.
Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 75 A.D.3d 821, 826, 907 N.Y.S.2d 70, 74 (3d Dep't 2010), and
Franza v. Olin, 73 A.D.3d 44, 47-48, 897 N.Y.S.2d 804, 807-08 (4th Dep't 2010).
136 Almeida, 74 A.D.3d at 1258, 904 N.Y.S.2d at 738 (emphasis added) (quoting
Walsh, 64 A.D.3d at 703, 883 N.Y.S.2d at 565).
137 Maya's Black Creek, L.L.C. v. Angelo Balbo Realty Corp., 82 A.D.3d 1175,
920 N.Y.S.2d 172 (2d Dep't 2011).
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the Fourth Department in Franza v Olin because the complaint
states a cause of action under both the law as it exists today and
the law as it existed prior to July 7, 2008.138
Therefore, the Maya court left the lower courts to fend for
themselves and niche possessors without repose.
D. Possible Erroneous Divestment of Property in the First
Department of the New York Appellate Division
Pending resolution of the issue of retrospective application of
the 2008 amendments in the First Department of the New York
Appellate Division, lower courts are continuing to apply the
amendments to all claims, irrespective of whether they involve
rights that vested before the amendments took effect. Thus far,
the Supreme Courts of New York County and Bronx County have
relied on a literal interpretation of the language of section 9 in
deciding whether to apply the amendments. 139
In Neighborhood Eighth Avenue, L.L.C. v. 454-458 W. 128th
Street Co., the Supreme Court of New York County applied
the law in effect at the time the action was commenced and
dismissed Plaintiffs claim.140 In 1996, Defendants allegedly
began adversely possessing a concrete strip of land owned by
Plaintiff.' In September 2008, Plaintiff sought a declaratory
judgment that Defendants had no property interest in the
contested strip of land.'4 2 Defendants argued that title to the
contested land had already vested in Defendants through
successful adverse possession and Plaintiff was barred from
bringing an action against them. 43 The court concluded that as a
..s Id. at 1177, 920 N.Y.S.2d at 174 (citation omitted).
13' See Neighborhood Eighth Ave, L.L.C. v. 454-458 W. 128th St. Co., No.
113189/08, 2010 N.Y. Slip Op 31160(U), 2010 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2081, at 5 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. Cnty. May 7, 2010); Serafin v. Dickerson, 25 Misc. 3d 1211(A), 901 N.Y.S.2d
910 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Cnty. 2009).
140 Neighbordhood, No. 113189/08, 2010 N.Y. Slip Op 31160(U), 2010 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 2081, at 4. The remaining elements not analyzed by the court required
possession to be: "(2) actual; (3) open and notorious; (4) exclusive; and (5) continuous
for the required period of 10 years." Id.
141 See id. at 2. Plaintiff and Defendants owned adjacent lots in the New York
City area. Id. Defendants' adverse possession claim was founded on their erection of
a shed and fence on the concrete strip, and their use of the property for storage. See
id. at 3.
142 See id. at 3.
14 See id.
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result of Defendants' awareness that others owned the property,
Defendants failed to establish that their possession was "hostile
and under claim of right."1"
In Neighborhood, because Defendants were niche possessors,
whether the pre-2008 or amended adverse possession statute was
applied could have been dispositive. For example, under the old
statute, Defendants' subjective belief about the ownership of the
contested property would have been immaterial to their adverse
possession claim.15 Had the court continued their analysis and
determined that Defendants successfully demonstrated the
remaining elements of adverse possession, title would have
allegedly ripened in Defendants in 2006, long before the 2008
amendments. 14 6 Accordingly, the First Department of the New
York Appellate Division should have applied the law in effect in
2006 and not 2008. If this case turned on one of the three
elements overhauled by the amendments, the First Department
could have potentially divested Defendants of their property.
Alarmingly, a recent decision by the Bronx County Supreme
Court strongly suggests that in a similar situation it would do
the same.147
III. RETROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF THE 2008 AMENDMENTS
Is UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND DIVESTS SUCCESSFUL
ADVERSE POSSESSORS OF THEIR PROPERTY WITHOUT JUST
COMPENSATION
A literal interpretation of the scope of the 2008 amendments
to New York's adverse possession laws-as described in section 9
of the amendments-conflicts with the legislative purpose of
the amendments and raises serious constitutional and policy
concerns for niche possessor claims. Section A compares
1" Id. at 4.
145 See Walling v. Przybylo, 7 N.Y.3d 228, 233, 851 N.E.2d 1167, 1170, 818
N.Y.S.2d 816 (2006).
" See Neighborhood, No. 113189/08, 2010 N.Y. Slip Op 31160(U), 2010 N.Y.
Misc. LEXIS 2081, at 3. Defendants began allegedly adversely possessing the
disputed property in 1996. See id. at 2. Since the statute of limitations is ten years,
title would have ripened in Defendants in 2006 if they met all the requirements for
successful adverse possession. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 212(a) (McKinney 2011).
"' See Serafin v. Dickerson, 25 Misc. 3d 1211(A), 901 N.Y.S.2d 910, at 5 n.19
(Sup. Ct. Bronx Cnty. 2009) (deciding that although the property rights at issue
probably vested in the 1980s, it was because the petition was dated before the 2008
amendments took effect that the 2008 amendments were inapplicable to the case at
hand).
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section 9's literal meaning to its legislative history. A literal
interpretation of its language appears to give courts permission
to apply the 2008 amendments to all claims filed on or after their
effective date, irrespective of whether they involve vested rights.
However, legislative history suggests that the legislature did not
intend for the amendments to be misapplied in this manner.
Section B discusses the policies behind the statute of limitations
for adverse possession claims and how retrospectively applying
the 2008 amendment to vested rights impedes each of those
policies. Section C enumerates the substantive and procedural
characteristics of the statute of limitations for adverse
possession. In contrast to the purely procedural statutes of
limitations that New York has revived and upheld as
constitutional in the past, the statutory period for adverse
possession is more than a mere proceduralism and deserves
greater protection. Section D argues that retrospectively
applying the 2008 amendment to vested rights violates the
Fourteenth Amendment as an unconstitutional taking of
property without just compensation.
A. Statutory Analysis of the 2008 Amendments
A statutory analysis of the 2008 amendments demonstrates
that the scope of the amendments according to a literal reading
of section 9 is starkly different from what the legislature
intended. A literal reading of section 9 permits courts to apply
the amendments to all claims filed on or after the effective
date.148 However, this broad application conflicts with both the
legislative purpose behind the 2008 amendments and the
doctrine of adverse possession in New York. 14 9  Legislative
history shows that the amendments were not intended to
retroactively divest successful adverse possessors of property
rights that vested before the amendments became effective."o
Instead, the 2008 amendments were meant to apply only to those
rights not fully vested at the effective date and to those that
accrued on or after the effective date.15 1
14 See infra Part III.A.1.
14 See infra Part III.A.2.
o See infra Part III.A.2.
mi See infra Part III.A.2.
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In cases of statutory construction, the threshold inquiry is
"how to discern the legislative intent."15 2 "When an enactment
displays a plain meaning, the courts construe the legislatively
chosen words so as to give effect to that Branch's utterance."
However, courts must avoid "blindly applyjing] the words of a
statute to arrive at an unreasonable or absurd result."154 Where
a literal interpretation would resort to a constitutional
deprivation, the statute should be strictly construed to avoid the
statute's invalidity.' Instead, the court should apply the statute
according to "the purpose of the statute and . .. the intention of
the [1legislature."Ie
1. A Literal Interpretation of Section 9 of the 2008
Amendments Allows Broad Application to All Claims Filed
on or After Their Effective Date
In effectuating the literal meaning of "legislatively chosen
words," all New York courts that have assessed the scope of the
2008 amendments have found that section 9 permits their
application to all claims filed on or after their effective date-
irrespective of whether the claim involves a vested right."'7
Amongst many others, the New York Supreme Court, County of
Tompkin agrees. 11 According to a literal translation of
its language, Justice Mulvey found that, "[T]he [2008]
amendment[s] ... effective on July 7, 2008, appl[y] to this action
inasmuch as the [Plaintiffs] claim was filed after the effective
152 Brown v. Wing, 93 N.Y.2d 517, 522, 715 N.E.2d 479, 481, 693 N.Y.S.2d 475,
477 (1999).
153 Id.
15 Williams v. Williams, 23 N.Y.2d 592, 599, 246 N.E.2d 333, 337, 298 N.Y.S.2d
473, 479 (1969).
155 See Alliance of Am. Insurers v. Chu, 77 N.Y.2d 573, 585, 571 N.E.2d 672, 678,
569 N.Y.S.2d 364, 370 (1991).
156 People v. Santi, 3 N.Y.3d 234, 243, 818 N.E.2d 1146, 1151, 785 N.Y.S.2d 405,
410 (2004) (quoting Williams, 23 N.Y.2d at 598, 246 N.E.2d at 337, 298 N.Y.S.2d at
478)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
17 See Brown, 93 N.Y.2d at 522, 715 N.E.2d at 481, 693 N.Y.S.2d at 477; see also
Adam Leitman Bailey & John M. Desiderio, Adverse Possession Changes Make
Results Less Certain, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 11, 2009, at 5 ("S.7915-C is now the law in New
York and applies to all cases filed after July 8, 2008.... [Elffectively end[ing]
adverse possession in New York after July 8, 2008.").
"' See Barra v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., No. 2009-0279 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Tompkins Cnty.
Sep. 14, 2009) (unpublished), rev'd in part and modified in part, 75 A.D.3d 821, 907
N.Y.S.2d 70 (3d Dep't 2010).
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date."'s Without further inquiry into the legislative purpose of
the amendments, Justice Karalunas reached the same result in
Franza v. Olin.o6 0 The facts in Franza's verified complaint and
supporting documentation indicated that title to the disputed
parcel would have vested in Franza "long before the July 2008
amendments."1 6' Nonetheless, the court applied the amendments
because Franza sought to quiet title six weeks after their
effective date.162 The amendments were retrospectively applied
and Franza's conduct was evaluated under the new requirements
of the amendments.6 3 This raises the question of whether a
literal-and therefore retrospective-application complies with
the "general rule . .. that statutes are to be construed as
prospective only."" In wrestling with whether a statute should
have a retrospective or prospective effect, New York courts have
insisted on "a clear expression of the legislative purpose to
justify . .. retroactive application." 65  And where a literal
interpretation of a statute would needlessly render a statute
unconstitutional, the statute should be strictly construed
according to its legislative purpose in order to avoid the statute's
invalidity. 6 6
2. Legislative Purpose of Adverse Possession and 2008
Amendments Does Not Justify Retrospective Application of
the Amendments to Vested Property Rights
The 2008 amendments do not demonstrate a "clear
expression of the legislative purpose to justify . . . retroactive
application" to claims where title ripened in the adverse
possessor before the effective date of the amendments.' New
York's adverse possession laws were amended in reaction to
159 Id. at 5; see also Asher v. Borenstein, 76 A.D.3d 984, 986, 908 N.Y.S.2d 90, 92
(2d Dep't 2010) ("The amendments applied solely to those actions commenced after
July 7, 2008.").
160 See Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 13, Franza v. Olin, 73 A.D.3d 44, 897
N.Y.S.2d 804 (4th Dep't 2010) (No. 2008-7065).
161 Franza v. Olin, 73 A.D.3d 44,47, 897 N.Y.S.2d 804, 807 (4thDep't 2010).
162 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
113 See, e.g., Franza, 73 A.D.3d at 46, 897 N.Y.S.2d at 807.
164 Shielcrawt v. Moffett, 294 N.Y. 180, 188, 61 N.E.2d 435, 439 (1945).
165 Id.
166 See Alliance of Am. Insurers v. Chu, 77 N.Y.2d 573, 585, 571 N.E.2d 672, 678,
569 N.Y.S.2d 364, 370 (1991).
167 Shielerawt, 294 N.Y. at 188, 61 N.E.2d at 439.
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Walling v. Przybylo1 68 and Robinson v. Robinson.16' Finding that
Walling and Robinson "encourage [d] the offensive use of adverse
possession," Senator Elizabeth Little proposed Senate Bill 7915-
C to reduce "stealth" takeovers by persons acting in "bad faith."7 0
In Walling, the court held that "[clonduct will prevail over
knowledge."" In other words, "adverse possession will defeat a
deed even if the adverse possessor has knowledge of the deed."17 2
In Walling, Plaintiffs' claim did not fail because they had "actual
knowledge of the true owner at the time of possession."
Instead, the court found that Plaintiffs' possession was in a
manner consistent with all of the elements required to
demonstrate successful adverse possession under the statute in
effect at that time and their title was upheld. 174
Just months later, the Robinson court made a similar ruling.
In Robinson, Plaintiff subjectively believed that Defendant might
have been the rightful owner of the property in dispute.17 s
Nonetheless, the court found that Plaintiffs subjective belief was
irrelevant to the court's decision of whether Plaintiff satisfied the
elements of adverse possession.1 7 1 Since Plaintiff satisfied all the
requisite elements of the adverse possession statute in effect at
the time, Plaintiffs title was upheld. 1 7
Thereafter, Senator Little sponsored Senate Bill 7915-C178 to
"curtail[ I]" the incentive created by Walling, Robinson, and
analogous cases where individuals "attempt[] to possess land
that [the individual] know[s] all too well does not belong to
[him].""' Citing the proposal as "legislation [that] is all about
good faith," Senator Little urged the legislature to bar adverse
possession claims unless the claimant demonstrates a claim of
1- 7 N.Y.3d 228, 851 N.E.2d 1167, 818 N.Y.S.2d 816 (2006).
169 34 A.D.3d 975, 825 N.Y.S.2d 277 (3d Dep't 2006).
170 Introducer's Memorandum in Support, Bill Jacket, ch. 269, L. 2008.
17 Walling, 7 N.Y.3d at 232, 851 N.E.2d at 1170.
172 Id. at 233, 851 N.E.2d at 1170.
173 Id. at 232, 851 N.E.2d at 1169-70.
174 See id. at 233, 851 N.E.2d at 1170.
175 Robinson v. Robinson, 34 A.D.3d 975, 977, 825 N.Y.S.2d 277, 280-81 (3d
Dep't 2006).
176 See id.
177 See id. at 977, 825 N.Y.S.2d at 280.
1s Senate Bill 7915-C was the proposed bill for the 2008 amendments to New
York's adverse possession laws. See Introducer's Memorandum in Support, Bill
Jacket, ch. 269, L. 2008.
179 Id.
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right in addition to the other requirements of adverse
possession.18 0 This "claim of right" requirement would eventually
be enacted as part of the 2008 amendments and defined as "a
reasonable basis for the belief that the property belongs to the
adverse possessor."a In addition to this new element, the
legislature also made two other substantial changes by making
de minimus encroachments and acts of routine maintenance
permissive and non-adverse. 1 82
Neither Senator Little's bill, nor Governor Paterson's
memorandum approving that bill, directly nor indirectly
addressed how the 2008 amendments should be applied. 18 3 There
are detailed records on why the statute was enacted and careful
crafting of the language of all of the other amended sections,
except for section 9.184 If the legislature considered the
repercussions of section 9 on vested property rights along with
the aforementioned amendments, they left no trail of those
concerns. Instead, section 9 appears to be more of a product of
poor drafting, and not a "clear expression" of the legislature's
intention to expand the scope of the amendments to all claims.
The legislature did not purposely craft the language of section 9
to include claims where title ripened in the adverse possessor
before the amendments took effect.
A clear expression of purpose, however, can be deduced from
the legislature's two-century-long trend in contracting, rather
than expanding, the statute of limitations for adverse
possession.ss The statute of limitations for adverse possession
was initially fixed at forty years in 1788,1s' reduced to twenty
years in 1829,187 fifteen years in 1932,8s and then was further
reduced in 1963 to the ten year period in force today." 9 A
shortening of limitation periods has been said to indicate
18 See id.
181 N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 501 (McKinney 2011).
182 See id. § 543.
183 See Introducer's Memorandum in Support, Bill Jacket, ch. 269, L. 2008;
Governor's Approval Memorandum, ch. 269, L. 2008.
14 See Introducer's Memorandum in Support, Bill Jacket, ch. 269, L. 2008; N.Y.
Gov. Veto (N.Y.A. 5364, Aug. 28, 2007), available at http://www.tax.ny.gov/pdfl
publications/orpts/legis/legsum07.pdf (vetoing a prior version of the same bill).
15 See infra notes 186-89.
186 See Ch. 43, 1788 N.Y. LAwS 683 (Weed).
187 See 2 N.Y. REV. STAT., pt. 3, ch. 4, tit. 2, art. 1, §§ 1, 5, 7 (1829).
18 See ch. 264, 1932 N.Y. LAWS 264, 264 (J. B. Lyon Co.).
18 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 212(a) (McKinney 2011).
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"political or legislative hostility to certain types of claims."190
More specifically, an effort to reduce the number of claims filed
against certain classes of defendants.'91 And in the case of real
property actions, the legislature has seemingly intended to
promote the adverse possessors.
Among other things, this trend acknowledges the
legislature's endorsement and encouragement of the productive
use of real property by adverse possessors.' 92 In a desire to
protect an adverse possessor's expectations and investments, the
legislature has consistently shortened the limitations period and
allowed possessors to quiet title to property more quickly. 9 3 By
bringing finality to claims of potential litigation, the legislature
has also increased the security of land holdings for this class of
defendants.1
It is possible-though dubious-that the legislature intended
to expand the limitations period under the guise of section 9 in
hopes that it would not provoke notice or debate.' But, this is
nonsensical in light of the current public trend to end adverse
possession, rather than have it preserved.9 6  Ending adverse
possession is not politically unpopular, nor would it provoke
controversy or outrage.' So, if the legislature wanted to expand
the limitations period for real property actions, it could have just
amended New York's civil rule that enumerates the limitations
10 Tyler T. Ochoa & Andrew J. Wistrich, The Puzzling Purposes of Statutes of
Limitation, 28 PAC. L.J. 453, 499 (1997).
191 See id at 499-500.
192 See Gregory M. Silverman, Dualistic Legal Phenomena and the Limitations of
Positivism, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 823, 845 n.82 (1986) ("Such principles [of private
property and ownership] might be commitments to promoting the efficient use of
land and its free transferability in the marketplace. These commitments may in turn
lead to others such as stabilizing uncertain boundaries and quieting uncertain
titles."); see also Lee Anne Fennell, Efficient Trespass: The Case for "Bad Faith"
Adverse Possession, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 1037, 1059 (2006).
19. See Silverman, supra note 192.
194 See id.
19' See, e.g., Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 190 (discussing how statutes of
limitations are sometimes changed instead of substantive law so as to not provoke
notice or debate where those substantive changes might be politically unpopular or
likely to provoke controversy or outrage).
196 See, e.g., END ADVERSE POSSESSION Now, END ADVERSE POSSESSION Now
ENDORSES NEW WASHINGTON STATE BILL TO STOP LEGALIZED LAND THEFT:
LANDMARK LEGISLATION, HOUSE BILL 1479, STANDS TO ABOLISH REPUGNANT LAW
OF ADVERSE POSSESSION (Sept. 15, 2009), http://www.eapnow.org/Supports%20HB%
201479.pdf [hereinafter End Adverse Possession].
197 See, e.g., id.
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period directly.' It did not have to dress up an expansion of the
statutory period in section 9's clothing. As the legislature has
done several times before, it had the power and opportunity to
alter the limitations period if it so desired. Its failure to do so
speaks concretely to the legislative purpose of section 9: to simply
provide an effective date for the new amendments and not to
abrogate vested rights by permitting, in some instances,
retrospective application of the 2008 amendments.
B. Retrospective Application of the 2008 Amendments to Vested
Property Rights Seriously Impedes the Fundamental Policies
Behind Statutes of Limitations for Real Property Actions
Retrospective application of the 2008 amendments to vested
property rights disturbs one of the most fundamental purposes of
statutes of limitations: promoting repose.'99 "[Repose
includes . .. [a few] distinct but overlapping concepts" 2 00 such as:
"(a) to allow peace of mind; [and] (b) to avoid disrupting
settled expectations."2 0 ' Retrospective application of the 2008
amendments to niche possessors' vested property rights directly
impedes each of the two aforementioned principles.
1. Retrospective Application of the 2008 Amendments to Vested
Property Rights Disturbs any Peace of Mind Created by
Vesting Title in the Niche Possessor
Retrospective application of the 2008 amendments to vested
property rights would unnecessarily disturb any peace of mind
the legislature sought to promote with adverse possession.
Statutes of limitations provide peace of mind because they
require finality. And, as the product of the expiration of a
statutory period, adverse possession is similarly predicated on
finality.20 2 Retrospective application of the 2008 amendments to
vested property rights abrogates the limitations period entirely
for niche possessors. This undermines the security the
legislature intended to create with a statutory period for real
property actions by making niche possessors vulnerable to title
challenges long after its expiration.
198 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 212(a) (McKinney 2011).
19 See Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 190, at 460.
200 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
201 Id.
202 See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 501 (McKinney 2011).
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On several occasions the legislature has expressed that
statutes of limitations play a critical role in quieting titles and
reducing uncertainty. For example, Governor Spitzer-in
vetoing Senate Bill 5364-A, which sought similar changes as
were later approved by the legislature in enacting the 2008
amendments-stated that, "[G]iven the frequency with which
property is sold and transferred, the imposition of strict time
limits on the ability of owners . . . to eject possessors of property
is the only way to give homeowners . . . the comfort of knowing
that their homes cannot be taken away from them."20 3 The
legislature also made their objective of promoting peace of mind
and reducing uncertainty evident by consistently shortening the
limitations period for actions in ejectment.2 04 After several
amendments, the legislature contracted the original forty-year
period for real property actions to the ten-year period in force
today.205  Retrospective application of the 2008 amendments
would unilaterally defeat the peace of mind and security created
by this limitations period for niche possessors by making them
vulnerable to the possibility of losing of their property for an
indeterminate period of time.
Some do not have any qualms about creating uncertainty in
this area of law. Opponents of adverse possession often argue
that this doctrine encourages the modern day "stealing" of
property, and they argue it should be curtailed and abrogated."
However, this argument only addresses one specific group of
cases. Adverse possession can only be viewed as encouraging
"stealing" where a possessor knew that the property was not his
and was therefore not under a claim of right, as is now required
by the 2008 amendments.0 7 Where a possessor did not know
that the property belonged to someone else, the doctrine of
adverse possession could not have served as the underlying
incentive to possessing the property. For example, consider
where a possessor built a house on property he knew belonged to
his neighbor. Under the laws in effect before the 2008
amendments and after the requisite statutory period, he
203 N.Y. Gov. Veto (N.Y.A. 5364, Aug. 28, 2007), available at http://www.tax.ny.
gov/pdf/publications/orpts/legis/legsum07.pdf.
204 See infra Part III.A.2.
205 See ch. 43, 1788 N.Y. LAWS 683, 683-84 (Weed); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 212(a)
(McKinney 2010).
206 See, e.g., End Adverse Possession, supra note 196.
20 N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 501 (McKinney 2011).
1084 [Vol. 85:1057
NEW YORK'S ADVERSE POSSESSION LAWS
successfully acquired title to the property. Twenty years later,
the possessor dies and leaves the house to his daughter. In 2009,
after the daughter has lived in that house for eight years, the
original owner tries to eject the daughter because her father was
not under a claim of right when he possessed the property.208 If
the 2008 amendments were retrospectively applied the original
owner would probably be successful in ejecting the daughter.
In addition, consider an individual who had a claim of right
to his neighbor's property. Assume a possessor installed a top of
the line fence and hired an expensive landscaper to create a
garden of exotic plants on land he thought was his but actually
belonged to his neighbor. The cost of these improvements was in
the tens of thousands of dollars. In 2009, after twenty years of
successful adverse possession, according to the laws in effect
before the 2008 amendments, the neighbor-owner tries to eject
the possessor. If the 2008 amendments were retrospectively
applied the neighbor-owner would probably be successful because
the improvements would fall into the category of de minimis
encroachments and would be deemed permissive and non-
adverse.2 09  Thus, retrospective application of the 2008
amendments does not only disturb the peace of mind of
possessors who acted without a claim of right, but also has the
potential to disturb the piece of mind of all niche possessors.
2. Retrospective Application of the 2008 Amendments to Vested
Property Rights Disrupts Settled Expectations
Retrospective application of the 2008 amendments unsettles
settled expectations.21 0  It is undisputed that an action in
ejectment is a reactive and remedial measure211-a means by
which the victim of another's wrongdoing can regain and protect
what is rightfully theirs.212 Nonetheless, as in most cases, there
are two sides to every story, and eventually "what is apparently
[a] mere matter of remedy in some circumstances . . . touches the
substance of the controversy, [and] becomes [a] matter of
208 See id.
209 See id. § 543.
210 Cf Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 190, at 464.
211 See Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S. 124, 132 (1882). Ejectment is "[a] legal
action by which a person wrongfully ejected from property seeks to recover
possession, damages, and costs." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 712 (9th ed. 2009).
212 See Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 190, at 464-65.
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right."21 3 For example, a person may have begun possessing a
parcel of land, perhaps mistakenly, and as time elapses the
person makes decisions or investments under the assumption
that he or she will continue to own that parcel.2 14 And, thus, the
interminable battle of interests between the adverse possessor
and the property owner arises: the interest in gaining title versus
the interest in not losing title. "At some point, the
psychological-and perhaps even moral-balance begins to tip in
favor of the" possessor.2 15  Instead of viewing the owner and
possessor as "victim and wrongdoer," the two parties eventually
become competitors for an asset,216 and "the acquisition of rights
by lapse of time is to be looked for in the position of the person
who gains them, not in that of the loser."2 17
But, such settled expectations are not created solely through
the passage of time. In 1829, when New York legislature crafted
its first adverse possession laws, it enumerated the type of
behavior that a possessor would have to demonstrate in
conjunction with the lapse of the statute of limitations in order to
gain title to disputed property.21 8 Essentially recognizing the
aforementioned shift of interests that may occur over the passage
of time, the legislature codified the type of behavior by a
possessor that justified the divestment of an owner's title.2 19
Allowing the 2008 amendments to apply to all claims would serve
to disrupt two centuries of settled expectations that the
legislature has enforced through the enactment of a statutory
limitations period and substantive requisites to acquiring title
via adverse possession. 220
213 Pritchard, 106 U.S. at 132.
214 See Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 190, at 464.
215 Id.
"[Tihe foundation of the acquisition of rights by lapse of time is to be looked
for in the position of the person who gains them, not in that of the loser....
A thing which you have enjoyed and used as your own for a long time,
whether property or an opinion, takes root in your being and cannot be torn
away without your resenting the act and trying to defend yourself, however
you came by it. The law can ask no better justification than the deepest
instincts of man."
Id. (quoting Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 476-
77 (1897)) (alteration in original).
216 Id. at 465.
217 Id. at 464-65.
218 See 2 N.Y. REV. STAT., pt. 3, ch. 4, tit. 2, art. 1, §§ 1-17 (1829).
219 See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 522 (McKinney 2011).
220 See WEED, supra note 68, § 5.01[1].
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3. Disrupting Settled Expectations Discourages Productivity
and Promotes Unjust Enrichment
The consequences of unsettling settled expectations are
twofold. First, productivity is stifled as a result of uncertainty,
and waste is encouraged. Second, unsettling settled expectations
allows original owners to reap the rewards of improvements by
possessors resulting in unjust enrichment.221
a. Uncertainty Discourages Productivity
"[NIothing so much retards the growth or prosperity ... as
insecurity of titles to real estate; and labor is
paralyzed ... [because] the enjoyment of its fruits is
uncertain."222 New York's statutes recognize that where a
possessor uses and preserves land for a certain length of time, he
has benefitted the community and he deserves and should be
awarded title to the property he used.2 23  Adverse possession
codifies this policy consideration. Productivity of land for a
statutorily determined period of time will vest the possessor with
title.2 24 However, as a result of the uncertainty raised by recent
New York cases in defining the scope of the 2008 amendments, a
niche possessor cannot rely on this premise in confidence. The
fear of subsequent litigation and divestment of title created by
the courts in construing section 9 according to its literal meaning
will discourage niche possessors from expending their efforts and
money on property if it could be stripped from them at any
time.225
New York's legislature and courts must take the clear
position that retrospective application of the amendments to
vested property rights is prohibited, or risk stifling productivity
of more than the niche possessor. If retrospective application is
not struck down, any adverse possessor going forward will
face the risk that a subsequent change to New York's
adverse possession laws will render the character of their
possession permissive. Today New York qualifies de minimis
221 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1937).
222 BUSWELL, supra note 39, at 8.
222 See Axel Teisen, Adverse Possession-Prescription, 3 A.B.A. J. 126, 126
(1917).
224 See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 522 (McKinney 2011).
225 Land also typically remains untouched, unimproved, and wasted during the
litigation of a disputed title. See BUSWELL, supra note 39, at 8.
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encroachments like fences as permissive. Tomorrow, New York
might make certain types of structural improvements like a
garage, permissive. The possibilities are endless, and only create
more uncertainty for the adverse possessor. Where uncertainty
exists, productivity will be stifled.
b. Reinstating Title in the Original Owner Results in Unjust
Enrichment
Unsettling settled expectations results in unjust enrichment
because it allows an original owner to reap the rewards of
improvements by niche possessors.2 26 Niche possessors by their
very nature have expended some level of effort, money, or both in
the contested property.2 2 7 Retrospective application of the 2008
amendments would allow an original owner to strip a niche
possessor of those efforts an indeterminate number of years after
title vested in the possessor. Thus, along with title to the
property, the original owner would also be rewarded with the
benefits of the possessor's labor and expenditures.
Proponents of retrospective application of the 2008
amendments might argue that New York already has a solution
for cases of unjust enrichment in real property actions: Real
Property Actions and Proceedings Law ("RPAPL") section 601.228
For over eighty years, New York has statutorily required that in
an action to recover real property the plaintiff may recover
damages for the defendant's occupation of the property.22 9
Recovery includes damages for withholding the property, rents
and profits, or use and occupancy of the property for a term not
exceeding six years. 230 Rents and profits are not to include any
value added by improvements made by the defendant.2 3'
Further, if the defendant has made permanent improvements on
the property, this value is to be deducted from any damages owed
to the plaintiff but not beyond the amount of those damages.23 2
226 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1937).
227 See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 522 (McKinney 2011).
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Under section 601, a defendant would lose any pour-over value if
he made permanent improvements that were valued at more
than the amount of damages owed to the plaintiff.23 3
However, this statute has traditionally been used in cases
involving holdover tenants where there is a strong public policy
to punish trespassers.23 4 While retrospective application of
the 2008 amendments essentially labels all possessors as
trespassers-niche possessors as well as those who never
acquired title-niche possessors were not trespassers after the
expiration of the limitations period.235 Thus, when a niche
possessor expended his efforts, monies, and time in making
improvements to a parcel of land during a time when he owed the
property and was not acting as a trespasser, the justifications
behind section 601 are no longer valid. While section 601 allows
a trespasser to lose any pour-over value of permanent
improvements beyond the value of use and occupancy, section
601 would similarly allow an original owner to be unjustly
enriched if there were any pour-over value of permanent
improvements made by a niche possessor. However, a niche
possessor could have made those improvements while owning the
property, and not while trespassing. Therefore, section 601 does
not address the potential unjust enrichment issues created by
retrospective application of the 2008 amendments to vested
property rights.
C. Statute of Limitations for Adverse Possession: Substantive
and Procedural
The limitations period in adverse possession is both
procedural and substantive and therefore creates rights
requiring greater constitutional protection than those created by
purely procedural limitations. New York courts have held, as a
233 See id.
234 See, e.g., Soho Dev. Corp. v. Dean & DeLuca Inc., 131 A.D.2d 385, 517
N.Y.S.2d 498 (1st Dep't 1987).
235 In Miceli v. Riley, 79 A.D.2d 165, 436 N.Y.S.2d 72 (2d Dep't 1981), an adverse
possessor, in good faith, built six houses on a disputed parcel of land without a
vested right in the property. See id. at 169, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 75. The court applied
RPAPL section 601 and declined to afford him an equitable remedy. Id. Instead, the
court enunciated that the plaintiff owner had an absolute interest in the property
and the defendant's only recourse would be to deduct the cost of the improvements
from the damages owed to the plaintiff for the use and occupancy of the land. See id.
at 170, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 75.
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general rule, that "[s]tatutes of [1]imitation do not create vested
or substantive rights; they deal merely with a remedy and are
available only as a defense."23 6 However, the statute of
limitations for adverse possession enumerated in Civil Practice
Law and Rules ("CPLR") section 212(a) is more than a "mere
proceduralism "237 that abrogates a party's "privilege to
litigate."23 8  It also creates "a substantive eligibility
requirement." 239  Although New York courts have commonly
upheld the revival of statutes of limitations in cases involving
procedural statutes of limitations as constitutional, section
212(a) also creates substantive rights and deserves a higher
degree of constitutional protection.
1. More than a Mere Proceduralism, the Statute of Limitations
for Adverse Possession Creates Substantive Rights
The statute of limitations for adverse possession does not
merely affect the remedy. It is so inextricably tied with the
requirements of adverse possession as enumerated in the 2008
amendments that they qualify the statute of limitations.2 4 0
Adverse possession may be both a sword and a shield;
substantive rights may be built upon it; and by fiction of
law . .. it is a source of- title upon which remedies may be
enforced and substantial rights asserted; hence, a statute of
236 People v. Hagan, 138 Misc. 771, 775, 247 N.Y.S. 374, 379 (N.Y.C. Spec. Sess.
N.Y. Cnty. 1931) (citations omitted); see also House v. Carr, 185 N.Y. 453, 460, 78
N.E. 171, 173 (1906) (Vann, J., dissenting) ("It is a general principle that the Statute
of Limitations may be used as a shield but not as a sword. The party attacked may
use it to defend himself, but he cannot use it for aggressive action or as the means of
getting property from the other party. Courts of equity, under ordinary
circumstances, do not open their doors to a plaintiff who can produce no evidence in
support of his claim for affirmative relief except the lapse of time and the Statute of
Limitations.").
2 Tanges v. Heidelberg N. Am., Inc., 93 N.Y.2d 48, 58, 710 N.E.2d 250, 254, 687
N.Y.S.2d 604, 608 (1999) (quoting Smith Barney Shearson Inc. v. Sacharow (In re
Smith Barney Shearson), 91 N.Y.2d 39, 45, 689 N.E.2d 884, 887, 666 N.Y.S.2d 990,
993 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2-8 Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 136 Misc. 2d 482,485, 518 N.Y.S.2d 996, 999
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1987).
2* Tanges, 93 N.Y.2d at 58, 710 N.E.2d at 254, 687 N.Y.S.2d at 608.
24 See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 501 (McKinney 2011).
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limitation, considered as a statute of repose, destroys or
extinguishes property rights, while adverse possession creates
such rights ....
It would be inaccurate, therefore, to pigeonhole section 212(a)
into this rigid dichotomy because it "deflies] characterization as
either purely procedural or purely substantive."242
A comparison of the New York demand and refusal
requirement for adverse possession of personal property to
section 212(a) illustrates that the limitations period in real
property actions accomplishes more than the simple barring of
stale claims.243 In several cases dealing with stolen or
misappropriated artwork, New York courts have had to decide
whether the "demand and refusal" element required to bring an
action against the possessor of the property is procedural or
substantive for the purposes of deciding if "demand and refusal"
should trigger the tolling the statute of limitations.2 44 Dispositive
to the characterization of "demand and refusal" as either the
former or the latter was whether "demand and refusal" was a
prerequisite to commencing an action to recover the property.24 5
Finding it to be a prerequisite, the New York Court of Appeals
held that the time to commence an action to recover personal
property begins to toll from the time the property is demanded by
the true owner and the possessor refuses its return.246 Without
"demand and refusal," a true owner cannot maintain an action
against the possessor."'
Similarly, expiration of the statutory period is a prerequisite
to successfully acquiring title to real property via adverse
possession. Section 501 of the 2008 amendments states, "An
adverse possessor gains title to the occupied real property upon
the expiration of the statute of limitations for an action to recover
real property pursuant to" section 212(a).2 48 Possession for any
period short of ten years does not transfer title to the
241 Hindley v. Metro. Elevated Ry. Co., 42 Misc. 56, 60, 85 N.Y.S. 561 (Sup. Ct.
Spec. Term N.Y. Cnty. 1903), rev'd, 185 N.Y. 335, 78 N.E. 276 (1906).
.2 Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 736 (1988).
24. See O'Hara v. Wallace, 83 Misc. 2d 383, 385-86, 371 N.Y.S.2d 570, 573-74
(Sup. Ct. Spec. Term Suffolk Cnty. 1975).
'44 Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 77 N.Y.2d 311, 319-20, 569 N.E.2d




248 N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 501(2) (McKinney 2011) (emphasis added).
2011]1 1091
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
possessor.2' Accordingly, while section 212(a) serves the
procedural function of barring the original owner's remedy to
recover his real property after the statutory period,250 it is also
incorporated into New York's adverse possession statute as
another required characteristic of possession. 5 Possession must
be "adverse, under claim of right, open and notorious, continuous,
exclusive, and actual" for the statutory period prescribed in
section 212(a).2 52 Therefore, section 212(a) is more than a "mere
proceduralism."2 5 3  It is also a substantive element of adverse
possession.
The manner in which New York courts deal with subsequent
disclaimers of title further demonstrates that section 212(a) is
not merely procedural. It is well established that a disclaimer of
title by the occupant of property made before the statute of
limitations has expired makes possession permissive-unless
possession at some point became hostile again.254 It defeats any
claims of adverse possession, stays the statute of limitations, and
protects the owner's title.25 5 In contrast, a disclaimer of title by
the occupant of property made after the statutory period will not
transfer title back to the original owner. In this case, the
disclaimer "is only evidence tending to show the character of the
previous possession."256  New York courts recognize that
expiration of the statutory period does not just procedurally bar
249 See id.
250 See Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 136 Misc. 2d 482, 485, 518 N.Y.S.2d 996, 999
(1987).
251 See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 501(2) (McKinney 2011).
252 Id.
2 Tanges v. Heidelberg N. Am., Inc., 93 N.Y.2d 48, 58, 710 N.E.2d 250, 254, 687
N.Y.S.2d 604, 608 (1999).
254 See Knapp v. Hughes, 25 A.D.3d 886, 891, 808 N.Y.S.2d 791, 796 (3d Dep't
2006) (noting that since Defendants use of land was with Plaintiffs' express
permission, Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment dismissing Defendant's
adverse possession should be granted).
255 See id.
256 Van Valkenburgh v. Lutz, 304 N.Y. 95, 103, 106 N.E.2d 28, 32 (1952)
(quoting Smith v. Vt. Marble Co., 133 A. 355, 358 (1926)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). "ITIhe recognition of the owner's title must occur during the running of the
statute, and not after it has run; for a title by adverse possession, once it is acquired,
is as full and complete as any other title, and no verbal transfer or declaration can
divest one of it." Smith, 133 A. at 358 n.12. And, in Russo v. Stoma, "evidence
submitted by the appellants regarding their alleged maintenance of the garden area
subsequent to the time when ownership of the garden area already had vested in the
plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact." 67 A.D.3d 769, 770, 887 N.Y.S.2d 865,
866 (2d Dep't 2009) (emphasis added).
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the original owner from bringing an action in ejectment against
the possessor, but that it also prevents that owner from
attempting to regain title to property that has already vested in
the possessor 25 7-also bolstering the premise that the statutory
period is substantive. Otherwise, subsequent disclaimers would
make possession permissive, irrespective of the antecedent rights
affected. By prohibiting this result, New York courts declare
section 212(a) as something more than a procedural mechanism
that bars the remedy, but does not affect the right. Instead, it is
a legal hybrid of substantive and procedural, and it creates rights
that deserve more constitutional protection than those created by
purely procedural limitations.
2. Rights Created by Statute of Limitations for Adverse
Possession Deserve a Higher Degree of Constitutional
Protection than Rights Created by Purely Procedural
Statutes of Limitations
In contrast to the hybrid limitation period in adverse
possession, New York courts have only upheld purely procedural
revival statutes of limitations as constitutional. For example,
some of New York's most common constitutional challenges to
revival statutes have been in the realm of toxic torts.m
Traditionally, limitations periods related to toxic substances
began tolling from the time of exposure to the substance."5 The
problem with this exposure-based system was that injuries
caused by toxic substances "may not appear until years after
exposure [and] long after the expiration of the period within
257 See Van Valkenburgh, 304 N.Y. at 103, 106 N.E.2d at 32 (Fuld, J.,
dissenting).
258 Toxic torts are "civil actions asserting a demand for recovery of damages that
arose from exposure to a chemical substance, emission or product, where that
exposure allegedly caused physical and/or physiological harm." Michael C. Anibogu,
The Future of Electromagnetic Field Litigation, 15 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 527, 570
(1998) (quoting 1 JAMES T. O'REILLY, 1 ToxiC TORTS PRACTICE GUIDE § 2.01 (2d ed.
1995)).
259 See Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 136 Misc. 2d 482, 484, 518 N.Y.S.2d 996,
998, (1987) (stating that the purpose of revival statutes and discovery-based statutes
of limitations is to address the deficiencies in redress created by exposure-based
statutes of limitations).
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which [the] action[] may [have] be[en] instituted."26 0 In response
the legislature revived statutes of limitations to afford parties an
opportunity to seek redress for these latent injuries.2 6 '
Defendants in toxic torts actions usually argue that a tolled
limitations period creates a substantive right that deserves
constitutional protection. Defendants claim that "the passage of
the applicable time bar" creates a right to be free from any future
claims of liability.26 2 Since revival statutes attempt to abrogate
those rights, they should be analyzed under a strict or
intermediate standard of scrutiny, rather than under a rational
basis review. 26 3  Nonetheless, courts do not find this argument
persuasive and have traditionally upheld revival statutes under
a rational basis level of scrutiny.26 4
Unlike the purely procedural nature of revival statutes in
the realm of toxic torts, the substantive rights created by the
limitations period in adverse possession deserve more than
minimal scrutiny. A toxic tort revival statute "does not eliminate
a cause of action but rather suspends the court's power to grant a
remedy."2 65  Essentially, whether or not a plaintiff brings an
action against a defendant, the plaintiff still suffered a
recognized injury under New York's laws that, but for the statute
of limitations, would be actionable forever. The only role of the
statute of limitations is to prevent the plaintiff from seeking
redress for those injuries past a certain date. In contrast, after
the expiration of the statutory period in section 212(a), the
original owner has no basis to sue the adverse possessor because
he no longer has title to the property.26 6 The right of a possessor
to be free from suit after the tolling of the statutory period in
260 See, e.g., id.; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214 (McKinney 2011).
261 See, e.g., Hymowitz, 136 Misc. 2d at 483-84, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 998.
262 Id. at 485, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 999.
263 See id.
26 See id. at 486, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 1000 (noting that the "[1]egislature acted
within permissible objectives relating to health, safety and welfare by reviving
causes of action based upon latent effects of exposure to toxic substances").
265 Id. at 485, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 999 (discussing actions enforcing debts, and
finding that statutes of limitations are only statutes of repose that suspend the
remedy, but do not cancel the debts); see also House v. Carr, 185 N.Y. 453, 458, 78
N.E. 171, 172 (1906) ("[Tlhe Statute of Limitations in [New York] never pays or
discharges a debt, but only affects the remedy, ... [and] [ilt would be within the
constitutional power of the legislature to repeal the Statute of Limitations and
revive claims, the enforcement of which have been barred by the statute for a
generation.").
266 See Franza v. Olin, 73 A.D.3d 44, 47, 897 N.Y.S.2d 804, 807 (4th Dep't 2010).
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adverse possession is therefore drastically different than the
right of defendants in toxic tort actions. Assessing the
abrogation of the former using rational basis scrutiny would
therefore be improper and would not adequately protect the
rights of niche possessors.
D. Divesting Adverse Possessors of Their Antecedent Rights
Without Just Compensation Violates the Fourteenth
Amendment
Application of the 2008 amendments to a niche possessor's
vested property rights violates the Fifth Amendment, 26 7 as
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, as a regulatory
taking of private property without just compensation.6 The
Fifth Amendment assures that "private property [shall not] be
taken for public use, without just compensation."269  Adverse
possession confers a right to private property and is therefore of
the kind protected under the Fifth Amendment.27 0 Use of the
2008 amendments to divest niche possessors of this right
requires that they be justly compensated, as to not run afoul of
the Fifth Amendment.
The United States Supreme Court has described at least two
categories of regulatory action that are compensable without a
fact specific inquiry into the public interest advanced by the
regulation. 27 1  The first includes regulations that "compel the
property owner to suffer a physical 'invasion' of his
property ... no matter how minute the intrusion, and no matter
how weighty the public purpose behind it."2 7 2  The second
circumstance enunciated by the Court is "where regulation
267 U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
268 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 472
n.1 (2005); cf. Bd. of Educ. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Miles, 15 N.Y.2d 364, 207
N.E.2d 181, 259 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1965) (striking down retroactive elimination of
possibility of reverter).
269 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
270 See Franza, 73 A.D.3d at 46-47, 897 N.Y.S.2d at 807.
271 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992). When faced
with a takings challenge, the Supreme Court has traditionally engaged in a fact
specific inquiry, rather than apply a set formula for determining whether a specific
legislation constitutes a regulatory taking. See id. But, the court has expressed two
discrete categories of regulatory action, which is compensable without inquiry into
the specific facts. See id.
272 Id.
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denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land ,"273
recognizing that "total deprivation of beneficial use is, from
the landowner's point of view, the equivalent of a physical
appropriation."2 74
Successful adverse possession vests the possessor with title
to property that is entitled to protection against regulatory
takings. It is well settled that where a statute of limitations
"touches the substance of the controversy, [it] becomes a matter
of right."2 75 Specifically, "the adverse possession of property for
the statutory period vests title to the property in the adverse
possessor" 276-a title to private property that is "as strong as one
obtained by grant." 7 ' Both New York Supreme Courts and the
New York Court of Appeals have held that such a vested property
right cannot be abrogated by statute2 7 8 unless such divestment is
for a public use and upon just compensation.2 7 9
Retrospective application of the 2008 amendments falls
squarely within both of the aforementioned categories, and
requires niche possessors divested of their rights to be justly
compensated. First, where a court fails to recognize a successful
adverse possessor's title to property, but instead revives the
original owner's title, the possessor suffers a "physical invasion of
his property."2 8 0 This invasion is more intrusive than those
273 Id.
274 Id. at 1017.
275 Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S. 124, 132 (1882).
276 Franza v. Olin, 73 A.D.3d 44, 46, 897 N.Y.S.2d 804, 807 (4th Dep't 2010).
277 Id. at 47, 897 N.Y.S.2d at 807.
278 See, e.g., Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 678-79 (1912).
279 See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 253 (1994). The Supreme
Court has also held that a vested property right cannot be abrogated by statute
unless there are mitigating considerations involved. See id.; see also Niagara
Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Niagara, 83 A.D.2d 316, 326, 443 N.Y.S.2d 939, 946 (4th
Dep't 1981).
[I]n an action to recover real or personal property, where the question is as
to the removal of the bar of the statute of limitations by a legislative act
passed after the bar has become perfect, such act deprives the party of his
property without due process of law. The reason is, that, by the law in
existence before the repealing act, the property has become the defendant's.
Both the legal title and the real ownership had become vested in him, and
to give the act the effect of transferring this title to plaintiff, would be to
deprive him of his property without due process of law.
Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 623 (1885).
"I Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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recognized by the Court in the past.281 For example, the Court
found that a New York law requiring landlords to allow
television cable companies to put cable facilities in their
apartment buildings, which occupied at most only one-and-a-half
cubic feet, was a physical invasion of their property and required
just compensation.28 2 Where an adverse possessor is stripped of
his title, it follows that he also loses all rights derived from such
title, including the right to use the land. Instead, the true owner
regains this right, and can use the property in any way a record
owner could. Excluding the adverse possessor from using the
property essentially equates to a physical invasion of the entire
property. In almost all cases, this physical invasion would
probably be much greater than the intrusion of less than two
cubic feet as in the aforementioned case. Therefore, retrospective
application of the 2008 amendments to vested property rights
falls within the first category of regulatory action, which is
compensable without a fact specific inquiry into the public
interest advanced by the regulation.
Application of the 2008 amendments to vested rights also
falls within the second circumstance enunciated by the Court and
is analogous to the legislation enacted in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council.2 83 In Lucas, the South Carolina legislature
enacted legislation that had the direct effect of barring Lucas
from erecting a house on his two parcels of land.284 The Court
held that where "regulation that deprives land of all economically
beneficial use . .. it may resist compensation only if the logically
antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate shows
that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to
begin with."2 85 Since Lucas acquired the two parcels at a time




284 See id. at 1007.
285 Id. at 1027.
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erecting single-family residences, the Court found that the
regulation effectively rendered Lucas's land valueless."'
Accordingly, he was entitled to just compensation.28 7
Similar to Lucas, a successful adverse possessor has the
right to use the acquired property in any manner that a record
owner could.28 8 By retrospectively divesting the possessor of his
title, and consequently his rights, the property is rendered
valueless to the possessor. He no longer has any of the sticks in
the bundle of rights of ownership and cannot possess, exclude,
use, dispose, transfer, enjoy, or destroy the property.28 9
Retrospective application of the 2008 amendments to vested
rights thereby deprives the possessor of "all economically
beneficial or productive use of land"290 and entitles him to just
compensation for his property.
IV. JUSTLY COMPENSATE NICHE POSSESSORS OR PROHIBIT
RETROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF THE 2008 AMENDMENTS TO
VESTED PROPERTY RIGHTS
The unconstitutional deprivation of private property and the
abrogation of the policy underpinnings of statutes of limitations
and adverse possession demonstrate that retrospective
application of the 2008 amendments must be prohibited, or a
remedy must be provided to those injured by its misapplication.
This Note proposes three solutions: (1) New York compensates
each individual property owner harmed by the misapplication of
the 2008 amendments; (2) the New York Court of Appeals hears
and decides a case on point and prohibits retrospective
application of the 2008 amendments; or (3) the legislature
modifies the language of section 9 of the 2008 amendments to
clearly prohibit its application to rights that vested prior to its
effective date.
26 See id. at 1008-09. Only if, on remand, the state enunciated principles of
nuisance or other property law that prohibits the use Lucas intended could the state
succeed in its claim that it was taking nothing from Lucas with the Act. See id. at
1031-32.
287 See id. at 1015.
288 See Franza v. Olin, 73 A.D.3d 44, 46, 897 N.Y.S.2d 804, 807 (4th Dep't 2010).
289 See Danielle M. Wagner, Comment, Property Rights in the Human Body: The
Commercialization of Organ Transplantation and Biotechnology, 33 DUQ. L. REV.
931, 933 (1995).
290 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
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A. Niche Possessors Should Be Justly Compensated for Their
Divested Property
New York should justly compensate possessors divested of
their property as a result of retrospective application of the 2008
amendments as required by the Fifth Amendment.2 9 Where a
regulatory taking has occurred, the United States Supreme
Court has traditionally held that an adversely affected property
owner is entitled to the fair market value of the property
taken.292 Accordingly, niche possessors should receive the fair
market value of their property on the day they are divested."
B. Court of Appeals Precedent Needed
The New York Court of Appeals should grant permission to
appeal to a case on point and render retrospective application of
the 2008 amendments unconstitutional. Such a decision would
bind all departments in the Appellate Division, namely the
Second and First Departments, which have yet to declare a
definitive position on the issue. As a result of the lack of clarity
within the First and Second Departments, unconstitutional
deprivations are continuing at the Supreme Court level. A
decision by the New York Court of Appeals, similar to the
decision in Franza, would create the precedent required across
the New York Appellate Division to curtail the injuries being
suffered by New York property owners as a result of the
legislature's inadequately drafted statute.
C. Modify Language of Section 9 To Clearly Prohibit
Retrospective Application of the 2008 Amendments to Vested
Rights
In crafting the language for section 9, the New York
legislature should defer to the framework it created in dealing
with the transitional period between using the fifteen-year
statute of limitations for adverse possession and effectuating the
ten-year period in force today. Simultaneously with the
291 See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
292 See United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 29 (1984).
293 See id.
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enactment of section 212(a) that prescribes a ten-year statutory
period for adverse possession, the legislature enacted the
transitional provision of section 218. Section 218 provides:
Nothing in this article shall authorize any action to be
commenced which is barred when this article becomes
effective .... Where a cause of action accrued before, and is not
barred when this article becomes effective, the time within
which an action must be commenced shall be the time which
would have been applicable apart from the provisions of this
article, or the time which would have been applicable if the
provisions of this article had been in effect when the cause of
action accrued, whichever is longer.294
In the notes following section 218, the Advisory Committee
further articulated that "[ilt is not intended that causes which
are barred prior to the effective date of the legislation be
revived."2 95 Following the enactment of section 212(a) and 218, if
a possessor adversely possessed property for ten years ending the
day before September 1, 1963-the effective date of the new
limitations period-they would not have a vested interest in the
disputed property. In order to have a vested property right prior
to section 212(a), possession had to be continuous for twenty-five
years. Accordingly, if on September 1, 1963, an owner was not
barred from bringing an action in ejectment against the
possessor, the owner would get the benefit of the longer of either
the old limitation period or section 212(a) to sue. In this
example, the owner would have another fifteen years under the
old limitation period and ten under the new rule. If, however,
the possessor had acquired title to the property through twenty-
five years of adverse possession prior to September 1, 1963, then
the new limitations period would be irrelevant, and the original
owner would still be barred from bringing an action in
ejectment.29 6
294 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 218 (McKinney 2011).
"6 Id. advisory committee's note.
296 See BUSWELL, supra note 39, at 10-11 (citing Cole v. Irvine, 6 Hill 634, 637
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1844)).
[Vol. 85:10571100
NEW YORK'S ADVERSE POSSESSION LAWS
The transition between the old adverse possession statute
and the 2008 amendments should be approached in an analogous
manner to the transition between limitations periods in 1963.
Section 9 should be modified to shadow the structure of rule 218
as such:
"This act shall take effect immediately, and shall apply to
claims filed on or after such effective date."297 "Nothing in this
article shall authorize any action to be commenced which is
barred when this article becomes effective."29 8  Where title
allegedly ripened in the possessor before the effective date of
this act, possession should be assessed according to the
requirements for adverse possession that were in effect at the
time of vesting. "Where a cause of action accrued before [the
effective date of this act], and is not barred when this article
becomes effective, the [requisite elements to prove adverse
possession] ... shall be . .. the provisions of this article ... "299
Under this proposed section 9, the vested property rights of
niche possessors would not fall within the scope of the 2008
amendments. The Franzas of New York, and the like, would be
safe from an unconstitutional deprivation of property as
permitted by the literal interpretation of section 9. For example,
in Franza, Sharon allegedly acquired title to the Olins' property
via adverse possession in 1985-after the ten-year statutory
period lapsed.3 0 0  Thus, Sharon's claim accrued before the
effective date of the amendments.3 0 1 Simultaneous with gaining
title to the property in 1985, however, the Olins became barred
from bringing an action in ejectment against Sharon to recover
that property.3 02 Under the suggested language for section 9, the
Olins could not commence an action in ejectment against Sharon
because they were barred when the 2008 amendments became
effective. Also, Sharon's claim would be assessed under the law
in effect at the time she allegedly acquired the property: 1985. If
Sharon did not satisfy the elements of adverse possession under
the laws of 1985, then Sharon never successfully acquired title to
the property and could not be unconstitutionally divested of it. If
297 Ch. 269, § 9, 2008 N.Y. LAWS 894 (McKinney).
298 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 218 (McKinney 2011).
299 Id.
"0 See Franza v. Olin, 73 A.D.3d 44, 46, 897 N.Y.S.2d 804, 807 (4th Dep't 2010).
01 See ch. 269, § 9, 2008 N.Y. LAWS 894 (McKinney).
302 See Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co.,136 Misc. 2d 482, 485, 518 N.Y.S.2d 996, 999
(1987).
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Sharon did satisfy the elements, the court would recognize her
title. In this manner, the suggested language for section 9 would
protect niche possessors from being improperly divested of their
property while still requiring them to demonstrate that they
properly acquired the property.
CONCLUSION
In 2008, New York legislature amended over one hundred
and seventy-five years of adverse possession law3 03 with three
momentous changes.3 04 Under the amended statute, possession
must be under a claim of right, and de minimus encroachments
as well as acts of routine maintenance are deemed permissive
and non-adverse. 0 The legislature coarsely defined the scope of
these changes in section 9 of the amendments by stating that,
"This act shall take effect immediately, and shall apply to claims
filed on or after such effective date."0
Many New York courts are construing section 9 according to
its literal interpretation without engaging in the requisite
statutory construction. As a result, courts are applying the 2008
amendments to all claims irrespective of whether they involve a
vested property right.3 0 ' However, retrospective application to
the vested property rights of niche possessors not only directly
conflicts with legislative history, but it raises serious policy and
constitutional concerns. Inquiry into the legislative purpose
behind the amendments, the doctrine of adverse possession, and
the purpose of the statute of limitations in real property actions
reveals that the legislature did not intend for the 2008
amendments to divest niche possessors of their antecedent
rights 08 in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 09
Although the Third Department of the New York Appellate
Dvision joined the Fourth Department in declining to apply
section 9 where it would permit the retrospective application of
the 2008 amendments to vested property rights, the issue still
remains unresolved in New York. Neither the New York Court of
303 Compare 2 N.Y. REV. STAT., pt. 3, ch. 4, tit. 2, art. 1, §§ 1-17 (1829), with Ch.
269, 2008 N.Y. LAWS 894 (McKinney).
31 See supra note 303.
"- See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW §§ 501(3), 543 (McKinney 2011).
3- Ch. 269, § 9, 2008 N.Y. LAWS 894 (McKinney).
307 See supra Part II.
308 See supra Part III.A.
3 See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
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Appeals nor the First Department has addressed how section 9
should be interpreted and consequently how the amended statute
should be applied. And dicta from the Second Department
suggests that if confronted with facts similar to Franza, the court
might interpret section 9 according to its literal meaning and
misapply the amendments retrospectively.310 While this issue
remains unsettled, New York faces an indeterminate period of
future litigation in this area, coupled with the abrogation of
vested property rights without just compensation in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
This Note proposes that either (1) New York justly
compensates each individual property owner harmed by the
misapplication of the 2008 amendments; (2) the New York Court
of Appeals hears and decides a case on point and prohibits
retrospective application of the 2008 amendments; or (3) the
legislature modifies the language of section 9 to clearly state that
the act does not apply to property rights vested prior to the
effective date of July 7, 2008. Using the framework created
by New York's legislature in dealing with past changes in
limitations periods for adverse possession, the 2008 amendments
should only apply to those rights not fully vested at the effective
date and to those that accrued on or after the effective date.311
"[A]s there could be no remedy" for original owners who lost their
property "without a corresponding right" to oust successful niche
possessors, "it was useless for the legislature to [facially] restore
the former, so long as it was prohibited by the constitution from
interfering or meddling with the latter."3 12
310 See, e.g., Almeida v. Wells, 74 A.D.3d 1256, 1258, 904 N.Y.S.2d 736, 739 (2d
Dep't 2010).
"n See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
312 Knox v. Cleveland, 13 Wis. 245, 249 (1860).
2011] 1103
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
1104
